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“AS FAR AS RESOUN AXETH”:
CHAUCER’S CHALLENGE TO THE GRISELDA TRADITION
Alison Langdon
For at least six centuries, the story of Patient Griselda has fascinated, 
inspired, and repulsed readers, often simultaneously.  This is a story 
that poses a sufficient challenge to move three of the greatest literary 
figures of the fourteenth century—Boccaccio, Petrarch, and Chaucer—
to try their hands at its telling.  In the process, each poet brings to the 
story his own imprint and his own moral lesson. While Boccaccio’s 
version is a masterpiece of ironic sociopolitical commentary, Petrarch’s 
redaction transforms the tale into a humanist, allegorical exemplum of 
constancy.  In the Clerk’s Tale, Chaucer brings Petrarch’s tale and an 
anonymous French translation into conflicting dialogue with one 
another, superimposing the French marital exemplum onto Petrarch’s 
spiritual allegory.  In doing so, I argue, Chaucer reveals a dissonance 
that emanates from the nature and ethical validity of Griselda’s vow 
that she will obey Walter’s will in all things as if it were her own.  This 
dissonance subtly but significantly challenges the exemplary force of 
the Griselda tradition, showing that constancy untempered by moral 
reasoning is a problematic virtue at best.
Many scholars find in the Clerk’s Tale a celebration of patience 
and constancy in the same line as Petrarch’s Historia. Readings of the 
tale such as those offered by Wimsatt, Levy, and Lawrence Besserman 
emphasize its analogies between Griselda and Christ, Mary, or Job. 
Exemplary readings see it as an expression of ideal human constancy 
leading to spiritual transcendence, Griselda’s patient suffering an 
emblem of obedience to God in His inscrutable Providence: “If 
Griselda showed such patience to the will of a flawed earthly husband, 
then what patient submission ought the faithful Christian show to the 
will of a loving and omnipotent God?” (Edden 370). Today’s readers 
find it difficult to accept the example Griselda offers because, too 
conditioned by modern realism, we do not see beyond the literal text 
and perceive its transcendent meaning, or value such extreme patience 
as a virtue. Reluctance to accept the Griselda story as an exemplum is 
symptomatic of “presentism”—we project our own culturally-
conditioned “resistance to patience” onto the medieval past (Morse 52).
Other critics see Griselda’s adherence to her vow as a positive 
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expression of the medieval insistence upon the correspondence of word 
and deed, finding any critique of this faithfulness unthinkable: 
“Griselda is presented as supremely good [by virtue of her patience and 
constancy], by signs which medieval readers could not take except as 
signs of goodness” (Sledd 78).  Much like Petrarch’s Veronese friend, 
who fails to be moved by the story because he cannot imagine any real 
woman with such patience as Griselda’s, we fail to recognize the tale’s 
stark alterity and approach it on its own terms.
Yet those terms can be troubling.  As Robert E. Finnegan explains, 
“We are asked to recognize in Griselda’s forbearance a positive 
exemplum of the Christian’s relationship to God; yet Griselda, 
deliberately fashioning herself an extension of her husband’s will and 
thus exercising the patience that Morse finds a mark of her ‘exemplary’ 
status, makes of herself an accomplice to homicide” (303). The 
difficulties of reconciling realistic and allegorical or exemplary modes
of meaning in the Clerk’s Tale become the focus of several important 
studies—most famously that of Salter, who finds these difficulties 
evidence of the Clerk’s own ambivalence toward the tale he tells, and 
including Ginsberg’s analysis of the Clerk’s incomplete understanding 
of his Petrarchan source.  Nevertheless, for many readers the realistic 
details of the Clerk’s Tale prevent acceptance of any parallel between 
Griselda’s situation and that of the patient Christian; such readers 
conclude that despite its religious symbolism the Clerk’s Tale is in fact 
a wholly secular story because it offers no providential pattern, and that
Griselda’s “preoccupations are characteristically human and this-
worldly” (Edden 371). Saul Nathaniel Brody is more explicit:
  
Not only is Griselda’s life not punctuated by divine miracles; 
in each test, the narrator’s asides and the actions of Walter and 
Griselda leave us to ponder how unlike God the husband is, 
how unlike a saint the wife is, how marriage is not a proper 
allegory for the relationships between man and God. . . . [The 
Clerk’s] story echoes other saintly narratives, but at the same 
time it undercuts their aesthetic and moral principles by 
making Griselda’s flawed humanity inescapable. (117)
I find that Chaucer’s version challenges our understanding of the 
Griselda story as a moral or ethical tale in ways that parallel Boccaccio. 
Although the Clerk’s Tale demonstrates no verbal echoes of 
Decameron 10.10 that establish Boccaccio’s text as a source with 
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certainty, we may still identify a source relationship between the two 
tales, in that they bear “certain striking resemblances . . . [and] closer 
parallels in plot or character” (Farrell 351, 352).  In addition, Chaucer’s 
version is more ideologically similar to Boccaccio’s than to Petrarch’s; 
though Petrarch admires the “resolution to affirm one’s choice in full 
recognition [of] changed conditions” (Ginsberg, Chaucer’s Italian 
Tradition 256), it is the problematic nature of such constancy that 
troubles Chaucer.  As with the Boccaccio version, in the Clerk’s Tale 
we are left with no unequivocal direction as to how we should read 
Griselda and her story; here, though, allegory’s dependence upon the 
letter of the text is foregrounded, and the reader leaves the story 
troubled by the socially destructive potential embodied in the 
allegorical reading of Griselda. Chaucer’s tale exploits the pathos of the 
Griselda story, not to encourage one to follow Griselda’s example, but 
to explore the limits of constancy itself as a virtue.  
In 1373, Boccaccio’s friend and mentor, Francis Petrarch, wrote to 
Boccaccio telling him that a copy of the Decameron had come into his 
hands.  Most of the work he damns with faint praise, as the pleasant, 
lighted-hearted and frivolous scribblings of a young man, but the story 
of Griselda impressed him so greatly that he decided to translate the 
story into Latin, the universal tongue, so that others unfamiliar with 
Italian might read it as well (655; Letters 17.3).  Petrarch is quick to 
stress that the story remains essentially Boccaccio’s while putting his 
own imprint on the tale, suggesting that his translation is what the story 
really means, what Boccaccio would have written as an older, wiser 
man: he will stabilize the tale’s volatile meaning, rather than leaving it 
open to the reader’s interpretation (656; Letters 17.3).
Petrarch concludes his translation of Decameron 10.10 with the 
following moral explication of Griselda’s story:
I decided to retell this story in another style not so much to 
encourage the married women of our day to imitate this wife’s 
patience, which to me seems hardly imitable, as to encourage 
the readers to imitate at least this woman’s constancy, so that 
what she maintained toward her husband they may maintain 
toward our God. . . . I would number among the men 
overflowing with constancy whoever would suffer without a 
murmur for his God what this little peasant woman suffered 
for her mortal husband. (668; Letters 17.3)
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From an ironic tale firmly situated in the real, material world, Petrarch 
draws a moral lesson applicable to the human soul in the spiritual 
realm.  He effects this in part by accepting as literal truth certain 
ambiguous or ironic details in Decameron 10.10 and then reading 
beyond the letter to discover transcendent truth.  He also expands 
Dioneo’s tangential observation that “celestial spirits may sometimes 
descend even into the houses of the poor” (795; 10.10) and uses this as 
the basis for his allegorical representation of Griselda.  In other words, 
he attempts to extract from Boccaccio’s story the aspects he finds 
pleasurable and instructive and to stabilize its more problematic ones.  
Not only, then, does Petrarch take the Dioneo out of the tale—in 
rhetorical terms, he converts Dioneo’s irony into pure allegory.
Many critics take it for granted that Chaucer embraces Petrarch’s 
moral. The assumption seems to be that if, “in his adaptation of 
Boccaccio’s story, [Petrarch] had been concerned to identify Griselda 
as an emblem of human constancy in the face of divine testing, then 
Chaucer’s attitude must be comparable—or, in any case, quite unlike 
Boccaccio’s” (Pelen 2). Thus Thompson argues that Chaucer also 
attempts to work on his audience’s affective faculties so as to give the 
story enough force to shock the jaded soul into recognition and, ideally, 
imitation: “[It is] only by eliciting such an affective response that 
Chaucer can succeed in making the allegory effective, otherwise it 
simply falls into the category of another medieval tale of the soul’s 
duty to God over which any audience, medieval or not, is simply going 
to nod” (305). Certainly this assessment would seem to hold true for 
Petrarch’s aim in writing his version, which greatly amplifies the 
pathos of Boccacio’s original.  In one of his letters, Petrarch explains 
preference for exempla as a means to inspire virtuous behavior:
There is nothing that moves me as much as the examples of 
outstanding men.  They help one to rise on high and to test the 
mind to see whether it possesses anything solid, anything 
noble, anything unbending and firm against fortune, or 
whether it lies to itself about itself.  Next to experience itself 
which is the best teacher of things, I would wager that there is 
no better way to learn than by having the mind desire to 
emulate these greats as closely as possible. (316; Familiari 
6.4) 
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Unlike those who hold theology to be primarily an intellectual science 
concerned with speculative or practical questions, Petrarch shows his 
affinity with those such as Bonaventure who believe that the affective 
force of Scripture is of the highest importance. Bonaventure explains 
that “our affections are moved more strongly by example than by 
arguments, by promises rather than by logical reasonings, by devotions 
rather than definitions. . . . Thus, if a man is not moved to heed precepts 
and prohibitions, he may at least be moved by the examples narrated ...
(235-36).  For Petrarch, too, exempla carry more force than appeals to 
the intellect.  
The danger of affective appeals, however, is that of losing control 
over the effects, and Petrarch himself was not able to control fully the 
effect his tale had on its readers, as he explains in a later letter to 
Boccaccio.  Petrarch recounts how one Veronese reader is moved not at 
all by the story, for he is convinced the story is entirely fictitious; if it 
were true, he says, no woman in the world could match Griselda’s 
patience and constancy.  Another reader, a Paduan, is so overcome with 
compassion that he cannot read through his tears and must pass the 
story to another to finish, but it is Walter’s cruelty that inspires the 
Paduan’s tears, not admiration for Griselda’s virtuous triumph (
  	
).  Neither reader responds properly to the moral of 
Petrarch’s Griselda, for both are completely caught up in the particulars 
of her circumstances rather than the universalized allegory, making her 
example problematic as a model of constancy.  
It is just such a problem that Chaucer takes up in the Clerk’s Tale. 
In spite of his reiteration of Petrarch’s moral, the Clerk himself finds it 
difficult to embrace the example he dutifully lauds, as evidenced by his 
repeated eruptions in compassionate indignation against Walter’s 
treatment of Griselda. A. C. Spearing observes that the Clerk “cannot 
bring himself to sympathize with the motive force of the whole story, 
the part played by Walter in causing Grisilde’s sufferings; and his 
disapproving attitude towards Walter emerges in the form of a largely 
personal commentary on Petrarch’s story” (90).  The Clerk’s response 
shows more affinity with Boccaccio’s narrator, Dioneo, who concludes 
that “it would have served [Gualtieri] right if he had chanced upon a 
wife, who, being driven from the house in her shift, had found some 
other man to shake her skin-coat for her, earning herself a fine new 
dress in the process” (795;10.10). Dioneo’s parting commentary “opens 
a breach in the moral statement of the story and, as he alludes to a 
different turn that the story might have taken, he unmakes the story he 
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has just told” (Mazzotta 128).  In his frame narrative Boccaccio does 
nothing to help unravel Dioneo’s moral knot. He explains that he 
undertakes this project for the solace of ladies suffering in love, who 
“will learn to recognize what should be avoided and likewise what 
should be pursued, and these things can only lead, in my opinion, to the 
removal of their affliction” (3).  The narrator himself seems no longer 
tormented by intemperate desire, so we might infer that he hopes to 
offer his projected audience a similar cure through temperance.  
However, in both the prologue and the epilogue, Boccaccio gives his 
book the alternative title “Prince Galhalt,” evoking the concept of 
book-as-pander as immortalized in Inferno 5 with Paolo and 
Francesca’s notoriously intemperate desire.  His conclusion to the 
Decameron further asserts that the drawing of any moral is the sole 
responsibility of the reader:
If anyone should want to extract evil counsel from these tales, 
or fashion an evil design, there is nothing to prevent him, 
provided he twists and distorts them sufficiently to find the 
thing he is seeking.  And if anyone should study them for the 
usefulness and profit they may bring him, he will not be 
disappointed. (800) 
Logic can persuade us either way; thus the will of the reader must be 
good so as to ensure that logic is informed by virtue, but Boccaccio 
leaves us with no guidance in our attempts to discover the moral import
of any of his tales, least of all that of Griselda.
Chaucer opens a similar moral breach in his own version for the 
story, for here the realistic details of the Clerk’s Tale militate so 
strongly against acceptance of any parallel between Griselda’s situation 
and that of the patient Christian as to render its exemplary force 
inoperable.  Chaucer effects this in part by interpolating elements of 
another translation of Petrarch’s Historia, the anonymous Le Livre 
Griseldis, which contravenes Petrarch’s exhortation to read the story 
for its moral of spiritual constancy by regrounding it in the real world 
of husbands and wives and putting the story to use as a marital 
exemplum demonstrating proper conduct for wives. In his conclusion 
to the tale, for example, the Griseldis author makes a subtle, but 
significant, change from Petrarch’s Latin.  Whereas Petrarch tells his 
tale “not so much that women of our time should imitate the patience of 
this wife” (“Hanc historiam stilo nunc alio retexere visum fuit, non tam 
Langdon
67
ideo, ut matronas nostri temporis ad imitandam huius uxoris 
pacienciam” [Letters 668; 17.3. Emphasis added]), the Griseldis author 
changes Petrarch’s “not so much” to “not only”:  “Ceste hystoire est 
recité de la pacience de celle femme, non pas tant seulement ques les 
femmes qui sont aujourd’uy je esmeuve a ensuir ycelle pacience et 
constance . . .” (289. Emphasis added).  This change insists upon 
Griselda’s female identity as integral to the story where Petrarch would 
efface it.
Similarly, in the Clerk’s Tale Walter is not testing Griselda’s 
patience, obedience, or constancy as abstract, universal qualities; 
rather, he tests her very femaleness, her adherence to the ideals of 
womanhood, as he explains at the tale’s end: “I have doon this deede / 
For no malice, ne for no crueltee, / But for t’assaye in thee thy
wommanheede” (ClT 1073-75).  Moreover, as Elaine Tuttle Hansen 
points out (199), the Clerk’s version of the story repeatedly calls our 
attention to the marital context of the testing of Griselda’s vow 
throughout the tale: “This markys in his herte longeth so / To tempte 
his wyf” (ClT 451-52); “But as for me, I seye that yvele it sit / To 
assaye a wyf whan that it is no need, / And putten hire in angwyssh and 
in drede” (ClT 460-62); “What koude a sturdy housbonde moore 
devyse / To preeve hir wyfhod and hir stedefastnesse, / And he 
continuynge evere in sturdinesse?” (ClT 698-700).  It is difficult to 
remember that we are to think of Griselda as a sort of Everyman when 
her womanhood is so foregrounded, despite the Clerk’s reiteration of 
Petrarch’s universalizing moral at the end of his tale.  In drawing upon 
both these sources for the Griselda story, Chaucer’s translation places 
spiritual allegory and realistic exemplum in cacophonic dialogue, 
rediscovering the human consequences that Petrarch attempts to 
transcend while still apparently insisting on the story’s allegorical 
import. 
Chaucer’s characterization of Griselda also complicates a purely 
allegorical reading of her story.  As in Petrarch’s version, she makes an 
implicit comparison between her trials and Job’s—“’Naked out of my 
fadres house,’ quod she, / ‘I cam, and naked moot I turn agayn’” (ClT 
871-72)—but she both prefaces and follows this comparison with 
details of her suffering.  She makes three pointed references to her loss 
of maidenhead in lines 837, 866, and 883, emphasizing both the faith 
that she brought into the marriage and the extent of its betrayal.  In the 
midst of this passage Griselda comes as close as she ever will without 
breaking her vow to expressing the agony she feels over Walter’s
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actions: “O goode God! How gentil and how kynde / Ye semed by 
youre speche and youre visage / The day that maked was oure 
mariage!” (ClT 852-54).  Her speech recalls the human ramifications of 
Walter’s testing of her.
One of the most significant alterations in Chaucer’s version is 
Griselda’s response when she learns her children are standing before 
her, alive and well.  In the Boccaccio and Petrarch versions, her 
immediate response is one of joy, but the Clerk describes a swoon of 
pent-up grief so deep that the bystanders can only pull the children 
from her unconscious embrace “with greet sleighte and greet 
difficultee” (ClT 1102). Severs argues that emphasizing the sergeant’s 
and Walter’s cruelty highlights Griselda’s meekness (233), but they 
also increase the pathos of the story, heightening the reader’s—and the 
Clerk’s—indignation at Walter’s treatment of her.  The real human 
elements—Walter’s capriciousness, Griselda’s deeply buried grief—
crowd the allegory to the point of incoherence.
Chaucer’s translation increases the pathos of the story but also 
makes it more difficult to accept the constancy that Petrarch lauds.   He 
does not permit us to overlook the potentially damaging effects that
constancy might have.  Patient, virtuous, and submissive as a wife at 
the same time as she is imprudent, misguided, and neglectful of her 
duties as a mother, Griselda presents a disturbing and problematic 
model.  Citing Clarissa Atkinson’s study of Christian motherhood, 
Barbara Newman argues that by medieval Christian criteria “the mother 
who abandoned a child or acquiesced in its death could still be 
considered a good mother as long as she did so for noble motives and 
with genuine though well-repressed grief” (52). Griselda’s grief is 
certainly well-repressed—perhaps too well.  The Clerk’s response to 
Griselda’s steadfastness echoes the French author’s comment that a 
nurse would find it hard to give up her charge the way Griselda does 
her own child, and, characteristically, the Clerk highlights the contrast, 
exclaiming, “Wel myghte a mooder thanne han cryd ‘allas!’” (ClT 
563).  He wonders at Griselda’s self-control, but also seems to ask what 
kind of mother would allow her children to be murdered without 
protest. 
The nobility of Griselda’s motives is questionable as well. Griselda 
as much as admits that she is sacrificing her children for her own 
benefit, to preserve the integrity of her promise.  As she kisses her 
infant daughter in a final farewell, she bids God accept the child’s soul: 
“For this nyght shaltow dyen for my sake” (ClT 560). Pointing out that 
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“sake” meant not only “on behalf of” but could mean “guilt” or “sin” as 
well, Victor Yelverton Haines argues that we should read “sake” in line 
560 as a pun that implicates Griselda’s complicity in her child’s 
murder: “[T]his very ‘sake’ as benefit [that Griselda is able to remain 
constant in her vow to Walter] is the same ‘sake’ as guilt in accepting 
the benefit of her child’s death for her sake” (95-96). Griselda’s 
statement encapsulates the morally ambivalent nature of her constancy, 
acknowledging that her constancy necessitates complicity in murder.
It is difficult not to get caught up in the real-world ramifications of 
Griselda’s passive submission.  The Clerk is fully aware of this, and 
hurries to ensure that his audience does not make the mistake of literal 
interpretation, insisting that “This storie is seyd nat for that wyves 
sholde / Folwen Grisilde as in humylitee, / For it were inportable, 
though they wolde” (ClT 1142-44).  The Clerk attempts to ensure an 
allegorical interpretation of Griselda’s constancy, repeating Petrarch’s 
dictum that “sith a womman was so pacient / Unto a mortal man, wel 
moore us oghte / Receyven al in gree that God us sent” (ClT 1149-51).  
However, as Kirkpatrick notes, “[W]hile the Clerk is allowed to 
recommend the lesson of constancy and humility ‘to every wight in his 
degree’ (1145), it is significant that before he proceeds to suggest any 
analogy between wife and soul and husband and God, he enters a 
concluding acknowledgement to Petrarch. . . . The responsibility for the 
analogy seems to be transferred firmly to Petrarch” (235).
Why should the Clerk wish to absolve himself of this 
responsibility?  Although Petrarch asserts the essential, transcendent 
truth of Griselda’s constancy, Chaucer questions the ethical validity of 
the vow that secures that constancy to begin with, especially in light of 
the consequences that follow.  Can we really praise such constancy 
when it supports something reprehensible and immoral? 
For many medieval theologians, the answer is a resounding “No.” 
Thomas Aquinas explains that a promise is a conjunction of reason and 
will, expressed through language. While Aquinas distinguishes between 
promises and vows (vows as promises made to God may be made 
through inward expression alone), the criteria for promises and vows 
are essentially the same. In his Summa Theologica, Aquinas explains 
that “[c]ertain things are good, whatever be their result; such are acts of 
virtue, and these can be, absolutely speaking, the matter of a vow: some 
are evil, whatever their result may be; as those things which are sins in 
themselves, and these can nowise be the matter of a vow: while some, 
considered in themselves, are good, yet they may have an evil result, in 
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which case the vow must not be kept” (Summa 2.2 88.2).  Aquinas 
illustrates this last point by referring to the story of Jephte, who 
promised to sacrifice the first creature that came to meet him if the 
Lord would grant him victory over the Ammonites.  Certainly the 
subject of this vow was a good one, a grateful offering of thanks; 
however, its outcome was evil in that first to greet Jephte was his 
daughter, and it is unlawful to offer a human being as sacrifice.  Jephte 
erred in two ways: his promise lacked discretion, for he did not qualify 
his promise by limiting it to those creatures that would make a lawful 
sacrifice, and because he sacrificed his daughter, his keeping of that 
promise was wicked.  Thus unexpected circumstances may release one 
from obligation to a vow or an oath if it “leads to an evil result through 
some new and unforeseen emergency,” for “[a]n oath must not be kept 
when it involves sin or a hindrance to good” (Summa 2.2 89.7). If one 
is not bound by a promise with illicit consequences even when that 
promise is made to God, the same would surely hold true of a promise 
between two human beings.
Chaucer seems agree with Aquinas on these issues.  In the Tale of 
Melibee, Prudence’s advice to her husband echoes Aquinas: 
Thou mayst also chaunge thy conseil if so be that thou fynde 
that by errour, or by oother cause, harm or damage may 
bityde. / Also if thy conseil be dishonest, or ellis cometh of 
dishonest cause, chaunge thy conseil. / For the lawes seyn that 
‘alle bihestes that been dishonest been of no value’; / and eek 
if so be that it be inpossible, or may nat goodly be parfourned 
or kept.”  (ParsT1226-29)  
In the concluding story of The Canterbury Tales, the Parson reiterates 
the three conditions of a legitimate oath:
And if it be so that the lawe compelle you to swere, thanne 
rule yow after the lawe of God in youre swerying, as seith 
Jermye, quarto capitulo: Thou shalt kepe three condicions: 
thou shalt swere “in trouthe, in doom, and in rightwisnesse.”  
This is to seyn, thou shalt swere sooth, for every lesynge is 
agayns Christ . . . . Thou shalt sweren eke in doom, what thou 
art constreyned by thy domesman to witnessen the trouthe.  
Eek thow shalt nat swere for envye, ne for favour, ne for 
meede, but for rightwisnesse, for declaracioun of it, to the 
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worshipe of God and helpyng of thyne evene-Cristene.  (ParsT
591-94) 
The Clerk’s Tale makes it clear that Griselda should remain faithful to 
her vow “as far as resoun axeth” (25)—the wording of the Clerk’s 
own oath to Harry Bailey.  We do not achieve the good through blind 
adherence to absolute moral rules; in this fallen world, right reason 
informed by faith is necessary to discern proper action in accordance 
with the good.  The Clerk’s philosophical allegiances—specifically 
Aristotelian logic as received through Aquinas—prevent him from fully 
embracing Petrarch’s own reading and the moral it expounds.  
As one who “unto logyk hadde longe ygo” (GP 286), the Clerk 
would most certainly share Aristotle’s conviction that reason is 
imperative for one to be truly virtuous.  In his Nichomachean Ethics,
Aristotle explains that real virtue does not develop without practical 
wisdom, which judges according to particular and peculiar instances 
rather than abstract universals (1141a; 6.7).  Thus, while the affective 
power of poetry can stir the emotive and imaginative faculties of the 
reader to will the good, the will must be mediated by reason in order to 
determine the good; otherwise an action cannot be truly virtuous.  This 
view is also supported by William of Ockham, who insists that reason 
is integral to virtue. In his early work, On the Connections of the 
Virtues, the will to act in accordance with “right reason” is the first and 
lowest of five stages, for it is not enough to will to act in accordance 
with right reason if one does so on the basis of extraneous, non-moral 
motives (169; art. 4.451, 169). Griselda wills the good in that she wills 
constancy, and constancy is indeed a virtue in the absolute sense—but 
only if enacted in conjunction with right reason, which determines 
whether the individual circumstances are appropriate.  This seeming 
contradiction—an absolute value that is nevertheless contingent—is 
symptomatic of the fallen human state.
In the end, the Clerk seems to have delivered exactly what the Host 
asked for, albeit in his own way.  Instead of offering a tale shrouded in 
abstract philosophy, the Clerk has retold Petrarch’s allegorized story of 
Griselda in such a way as to bring it firmly down to earth. Just as the 
final tale of the Decameron prompts the brigata to return from their 
escapist idyll in the countryside to plague-ridden Florence, the Clerk’s 
Tale forces the Griselda story back into the real world, in which 
contingent circumstances may require one to take a broader view of 
virtues of constancy.  At first blush, the Clerk and Dioneo could not 
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seem more different; the one is devout and bookish, a scholar whose 
speech is decorous and “ful of hy sentence” (GP 306), the other is a 
sophisticated, mischievous cynic prone to tales of wit and ribaldry.  
However, the Clerk’s Envoy functions in much the same way as 
Dioneo’s ambivalent conclusion to Decameron 10.10, in that its 
apparent irony undercuts any moral lesson: are we to imitate Griselda, 
or not?  The trouthe of the tale—its spiritual virtue—is as uncertain as 
the virtue of Griselda’s trouthe with Walter.
Western Kentucky University
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Note
I would like to express my gratitude to the members of Potter College 
Faculty Writing Group at Western Kentucky University and to the 
anonymous reviewer whose comments and suggestions helped 
streamline this paper.
1 For a thorough, comparative discussion of Chaucer’s use of 
Petrarch and the Griseldis, see J. Burke Severs, especially 215-28.
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